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Abstract 
Crop producers have numerous marketing and risk management tools available. Research 
relating producers’ risk attitudes to their use of these tools has produced mixed results, and most 
studies focus on individual tools to the neglect of complementarities among them. Hence, little is 
known about the proportion in which these tools are used, e.g., the percentage of the crop that is 
forward sold as opposed to hedged. This study identifies some factors, including risk attitude, 
that impact the proportion of corn producers’ sales through spot markets, futures and options, 
and forward and production contracts using complementary survey and accounting data.  
 
 
Keywords: risk behavior, risk attitude, futures and options, forward contracts, production 
contracts. 
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Crop producers have numerous marketing and risk management tools available. Research on 
producers’ use of these tools has produced relevant but sometimes puzzling results. For instance, 
the role of risk aversion appears ambiguous, as some studies find a strong relationship between 
risk aversion and the use of risk management instruments while others do not (e.g., Pennings and 
Garcia 2001; Rabin and Thaler 2001). Most research has focused on relatively simple choices, 
such as whether to use futures and options contracts (Pennings and Leuthold 2000a) or crop 
insurance (Knight and Coble 1997), and few studies examine a broader array of marketing and 
risk management choices. While Pennings, et al. (2008) identify factors influencing the portfolio 
of marketing and risk management tools that producers adopt, less is known about how such 
factors influence the proportion in which these tools are used, e.g., the factors influencing the 
percentage of the crop that is forward sold as opposed to hedged. Other studies examine the 
proportion of crop sales made using a particular marketing method but offer little insight 
regarding how the use of one marketing tool influences the use of another (e.g., Shapiro and 
Brorsen 1988; Goodwin and Schroeder 1994; Musser, Patrick, and Eckman 1996; Sartwelle, 
O’Brien, Tierney, and Eggers 2000; Katchova and Miranda 2004). 
This study identifies some factors, including risk attitude, that impact the proportion of 
corn and soybean producers’ sales through spot markets, futures and options, forward contracts, 
and production contracts using complementary survey and accounting data. Secondary 
accounting data control for farm size and their financial state (e.g., debt structure), while primary 
survey data capture producers’ age and risk attitude. We elicit risk attitude measures directly 
(Roe 1982), instead of computing indirect measures from observed behavior (e.g., Moscardi and 
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de Janvery 1977; Antle 1987).  Two main approaches to directly eliciting risk attitudes exist: 
measures derived from the expected utility framework and measures derived from responses to 
multi-item scales (c.f., Pennings and Garcia [2001] for a measure combining both approaches).  
We use the lower-cost multi-item scale approach and factor analysis (Hair et al. 1995) of 
producers’ responses to limit measurement error of latent risk attitudes.  
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  The literature on crop producers’ use 
of risk management and marketing tools is reviewed in the next section.  Subsequently, sample 
representativeness and data collection are discussed in the research design section, followed by a 
description of the empirical methods.  Next, empirical results are presented followed by a 
discussion of the findings and suggestions for future research. 
 
Literature Review 
 The empirical literature pertaining to crop producers’ use of marketing tools is reviewed in this 
section.  Selected findings on the proportion of crops sold in studies discussed below are 
summarized in Table 1 to facilitate comparison with our own results as discussed later. 
Shapiro and Brorsen (1988) used tobit models to examine the factors influencing 41 
Indiana corn, soybean, and wheat producers’ use of futures markets.  Producers’ perceptions of 
the ability of futures markets to increase and to stabilize income both had significantly positive 
effects, as did off-farm income, the debt-to-asset ratio, and farm acreage.  Years of farming 
experience and formal education had significantly negative effects.  The most important factors 
were perceptions regarding income stability, followed by the debt-to-asset ratio.  Using similar 
data on 62 Indiana corn and soybean producers and tobit models, Musser, Patrick, and Eckman 
(1996) investigated the factors influencing the percentage of expected harvest that was forward 
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priced using any type of marketing arrangement.  The debt-to-asset ratio had a significantly 
positive impact on the maximum percentage of expected soybean production that producers 
would forward price, which is consistent with Shaprio and Brorsen’s (1988) previous results.  
Age and education had significantly negative and positive effects, respectively, on the forward 
pricing of corn, as younger producers have more time to recover the costs of learning forward 
pricing methods and further education facilitates their use.  Farm scale, as measured by gross 
income, had a significantly negative impact on the forward pricing of corn.  Risk aversion 
toward losses had a significantly positive impact on the maximum percentage that producers 
would forward price for both corn and soybeans.  Dummy variables for options/minimum-price 
contracts and for futures hedges generally had significantly positive impacts on forward pricing 
for both corn and soybeans, suggesting that joint portfolio effects may exist. 
 Goodwin and Schroeder (1994) used probit and tobit models to investigate factors 
influencing whether 509 Kansas producers forward price their output using futures and/or 
forward contracts and how much of it they forward price.  In general, experience had a 
significantly negative effect on use of forward pricing and the proportion of output forward 
priced, while farm size in acres, education, the debt-to-asset ratio, and risk aversion had 
significantly positive effects.  These variables all had similar effects on producers’ attendance of 
marketing or risk management seminars which also significantly increased the probability of 
forward pricing and the proportion of output forward sold. 
Sartwelle, O’Brien, Tierney, and Eggers (2000) used tobit and multinomial logit models 
to examine the factors that influence 351 Kansas, Texas, and Iowa grain producers’ use of cash 
sales, forward contracts, and futures and options.  Cash sales decreased and forward contracting 
increased significantly with farm size (i.e., crop acreage) in tobit regressions.  A survey item 
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regarding farm size relative to others in their region also significantly decreased cash sales in the 
tobit analysis and increased use of forward contracts and futures and options relative to cash 
sales in multinomial logit regressions.  Both tobit and logit models indicated that use of futures 
and options decreased with experience in agriculture.  Diversifying into livestock production 
increased cash sales and decreased forward contracting significantly in both analyses.  Crop 
insurance increased use of forward contracts and futures and options and decreased cash sales 
significantly in both analyses.  Their measure of risk attitude was statistically insignificant in all 
regressions. 
 Katchova and Miranda (2004) raised doubt about much of this prior research by 
identifying that previous results may have confounded explanatory variables’ contract adoption 
effects with their influence on the quantity contracted.  Using USDA ARMS data on corn, 
soybean, and wheat producers, the authors demonstrated that results of Tobit models performed 
on samples with observations of zero contracting are strongly influenced by and almost identical 
to the adoption decision, i.e., binary probit results.1  Hurdle models explaining the proportion of 
crop contracted, the frequency of contracting, and contract type (i.e., forward or specialty 
marketing contract) conditional on contract adoption revealed few consistent impacts across 
commodities for the conditional or truncated regressions.  In some cases the signs of significant 
effects were the opposite of those for Tobit regressions in their own work and in previous 
studies.  Unfortunately, the study was unable to provide any insights into the impacts of risk 
aversion due to unavailability of measures in the ARMS dataset. 
 Identifying that crop producers utilize numerous combinations of marketing and risk 
management tools, Pennings, et al. (2008) employed multinomial logit analysis and a choice 
bracketing framework to investigate the factors that influence the portfolio of tools adopted.  The 
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sample consisted of commercial producers that subscribe to agricultural market information and 
advisory services from a US firm via satellite.  At a broad bracketing level, adoption of forward 
pricing tools and crop insurance in combination was significantly more likely for younger 
producers, larger farms, and farms that had not diversified into livestock production.  These 
variables were also important at medium bracketing levels that included forward pricing 
categories of exchange, exchange-derived, and non-exchange-derived instruments (i.e., futures 
and options, hedge-to-arrive and basis contracts, and forward contracts, respectively) and 
insurance categories of catastrophic, yield insurance, and revenue insurance products.  Though 
essentially unimportant at broader bracketing levels, risk aversion mattered at the narrowest 
bracketing level for choices of combined use of futures and options and for choices of combined 
use of hail and other yield insurance products.  While the study provided interesting insights into 
combinations in which marketing and risk management tools are adopted, it did not consider the 
proportion in which each tool in the portfolio was utilized. 
 
Discussion of the Data Sample 
A unique dataset was assembled by surveying a sample of crop producers, for which annual 
accounting and production records are kept through the University of Illinois Farm Business 
Farm Management (FBFM) Extension program. FBFM is a cooperative educational-service 
available to all agricultural producers in the state for a fee (Lattz, Cagley, and Raab 2005). The 
program is designed to assist producers with management decisions by providing business 
analysis through computer-assisted processing of records for income tax management. The 
secondary production and accounting data are collected annually by 58 full time field staff 
specialists serving nine FBFM associations. 
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Four rounds of pre-tests – two with FBFM personnel and two with producers – were 
performed. In each case, survey items were modified, eliminated, and added based on comments. 
One hundred fifty producers were contacted and as encouragement for their participation were 
offered a chance at one of ten $100 lottery prizes. Personal interviews, averaging just over an 
hour, limited the sample size but enhanced the reliability of responses. In total, 48 producers 
participated in the interviews from December 2006 through April 2007.   
Since producers’ use of marketing arrangements may vary from year to year, producers 
were asked to select from pre-defined ranges to approximate the percentage of their expected 
production that they sold using various marketing arrangements in marketing year 2006. 
Averages of these ranges are used here to construct the dependent variables. Since the respective 
minimum and maximum available responses were zero percent and greater than 75%, the 
resulting dependent variables are truncated with a minimum of zero percent and a maximum of 
88% (= (75%+100%)/2). The marketing arrangements included categories of futures and options, 
forward contracts including hedge-to-arrive contracts, production contracts for seed and non-
genetically modified crop production for instance, and a category for any proportion sold on the 
spot with no form of price protection. 
Producers were asked to respond to a series of survey items previously validated by 
Pennings and Garcia (2001) for the construction of factor analytic measures of latent risk 
attitudes.  Items were scaled negative four to positive four, so that negative numbers indicate 
risk-seeking, positive numbers indicate risk-aversion, and zero indicates risk-neutral. Producers 
responded to these items separately for corn and soybeans, so that separate risk attitude measures 
could be computed to correspond specifically to respective corn and soybean marketing contexts. 
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Cronbach’s (1951) alphas exceeding 0.70, specifically 0.80 for corn and 0.79 for soybeans, 
indicate that the resulting risk attitude measures are highly reliable. 
 
Representativeness and Summary Statistics 
Presently, about one out of five Illinois commercial farms with over 500 acres or over $100,000 
total farm sales participate. “(T)he data from recordkeeping farms may be used with reasonable 
confidence, even though the recordkeeping farms as a group do not represent a cross section of 
all commercial farms in the state” (Lattz, Cagley, and Raab 2005, p. 1).  Consistent with prior 
research on producers participating in farm management associations (e.g., Goodwin and 
Schroeder 1994) and subscribing to advisory services (e.g., Pennings, et al. 2008), surveyed 
FBFM farms are larger and more commercial than typical US farms (Table 2).  Relative to 2007 
USDA Census data, the distribution of FBFM farms by size is also more similar to the sample 
obtained by Pennings, et al. (2008).  Producers in our sample range in age from 39 to 76 with a 
mean of 55 and a standard deviation of about 8 years. About 33% have completed four or more 
years of college, 38% have completed some college, and 29% have complete only high school. 
Mean education levels are about 14 years in Shapiro and Brorsen (1988) and in Goodwin and 
Schroeder (1994) and 15years in Musser, Patrick and Eckman (1996). The debt-to-asset ratio for 
producers in our sample ranges from one percent to 69% with a mean of 24% and a standard 
deviation of about 16%, which suggests degrees of leverage that are similar to Shapiro and 
Brorsen’s (1988) and Musser, Patrick and Eckman’s (1996) samples. As in prior research (e.g., 
Shapiro and Brorsen 1988; Pennings, et al. 2008), the majority of producers in our sample are 
risk-averse with respect to both corn (59%) and soybean (58%), and the average producers is 
moderately risk-averse. 
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Surveyed FBFM producers’ use of contracts is also more representative of large 
commercial producers than it is of typical US producers (Table 3). In the USDA-ARMS dataset 
analyzed by Katchova and Miranda (2004), only 12% of corn producers, 8% of soybean 
producers, and 5% of wheat producers use marketing contracts including flat or fixed price, 
formula pricing, delayed price, minimum price, fixed basis, futures fixed, and other contracts. By 
comparison, of the 48 producers in our sample raising corn (soybeans), about 42% (40%) use 
futures and options, 88% (83%) use forward contracts, 33% (31%) use hedge-to-arrive contracts, 
10% (25%) use production contracts.  Similarly, in the sample studied by Pennings, et al. (2008), 
about 40% of producers use futures, 37% use options, 82% use forward contract, and 21% use 
hedge-to-arrive contracts.  Though adoption rates are somewhat lower in Goodwin and 
Schroeder (1994), producers using contracts in their study market similar proportions of output 
using those contracts as in our sample.  Specifically, producers using the respective contracts to 
market corn (soybeans) in our sample make 36% (32%) of sales using futures and options, 43% 
(40%) using forward contracts, and 29% (35%) using production contracts.  Producers using the 
respective contracts to market corn (soybeans) in Goodwin and Schroeder (1994) make 34% 
(29%) of sales using futures, 29% (37%) using options, and 37% (33%) using forward contracts.   
 
Empirical Methods 
Several studies investigating determinants of the proportion of a crop contracted have employed 
Tobit procedures (e.g., Shapiro and Brorsen 1988; Goodwin and Schroeder 1994; Musser, 
Patrick and Eckman 1996). The log-likelihood for the Tobit model contains probabilities of 
nonuse of contracts from a Probit regression in the first term and a classical regression for 
positive amounts contracted in the second term: 
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where Ф(•) is the standard normal probability density function, xi and βα are vectors of 
independent variables and coefficients, σ is the standard deviation, and αi denotes the proportion 
contracted.2  Following Katchova and Miranda (2004), αi is not constrained from above since a 
producer conceivably may contract more than his actual ex post production. Under the Tobit 
formulation, the independent variables and associated coefficients are constrained to be the same 
for the contract adoption and proportion contracted decisions. Cragg’s (1971) less restrictive 
hurdle or two-step model does not require the variables and coefficients for both decisions to be 
the same.  The log-likelihood is the sum of the log-likelihood of a Probit regression (the first two 
terms) and the log-likelihood of a truncated regression (the second two terms) and is given by 
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where zi and γ are vectors of independent variables and coefficients pertaining to contract 
adoption and, and as before, xi and βi are vectors of independent variables and coefficients 
pertaining to the proportion contracted.  When zi = xi and γ = βα/σ, these models are equivalent. 
 
Empirical Results 
Marginal effects for Tobit and hurdle models of spot market, futures and options, and forward 
contract, usage are reported in Tables 4 through 6. Corresponding model results are presented for 
production contracting of soybeans in Table 7. As only four production contracts for corn exist in 
our dataset, this aspect of corn marketing could not be modeled. Two-limit or double-censored 
Tobit regressions are useful when several observations exist at upper as well as lower limits of 
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the dependent variable (Goodwin and Schroeder 1994; Sartwelle, O’Brien, Tierney, and Eggers 
2000). Following Katchova and Miranda (2004), we compare the results of Tobit models 
censored only at zero and hurdle models, since we surveyed producers on the proportion of 
expected production that was contracted which conceivably may exceed the realized production. 
Particularly, in the case of futures and options, quantities contracted may exceed expected 
production due to speculative behavior (Musser, Patrick and Eckman 1996). Two-limit Tobit 
regressions yield results that are qualitatively similar to the Tobit regression results presented 
here and are available from the authors upon request. 
 Unlike Katchova and Miranda’s (2004) analysis, where Tobit results appeared to be 
driven by the binary Probit results for contract adoption, the Tobit models presented here are 
mostly consistent with the truncated regression results for the proportion contracted in hurdle 
models. For forward contracting regressions, this consistency likely reflects that most producers 
use forward contracts, and hence, there are so few zero observations that Tobit models are 
unlikely to confound adoption effects with independent variables’ effects on the proportion 
contracted (Table 6). In fact, binary Probit regressions are unable to detect significant effects for 
soybean forward contracting and are infeasible for corn forward contracting due to the limited 
number of zero observations. The potential value of the hurdle approach is apparent, though, as 
certain variables at times have opposite effects on the adoption and proportion decisions. No 
instance exists, however, in which the opposing effects are both statistically different from zero. 
The significantly positive marginal effect of education on the adoption of corn futures and 
options and the insignificantly negative marginal effect on the proportion of the crop for which 
they are used is an example (Table 5). For simplicity, the remainder of the discussion focuses on 
the hurdle model results unless otherwise indicated. 
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Spot regressions suggest that for each additional year of age, a producer will sell about 
one to two percent more soybeans in spot markets (Table 4). The marginal effect in the truncated 
regression for corn is of similar magnitude and nearly significant (p-value = 0.108). Age also 
decreases the adoption of futures and options significantly for soybeans and nearly significantly 
for corn (p-value = 0.106) and significantly decreases the proportion of soybeans sold using 
forward and production contracts (Tables 5, 6, and 7). The results for futures and options 
adoption are consistent with the findings of Musser, Patrick, and Eckman (1996), who argued 
that older producers have less time before retirement to recover the learning and adjustment costs 
associated with risk management instruments, and hence, are less likely to adopt them. Shapiro 
and Brorsen (1988) and Goodwin and Schroeder (1994) find similar negative effects for 
experience on the proportion forward priced and the proportion hedged, respectively. 
Producers possessing Bachelor of Science degrees sell about 19% and 21% less corn and 
soybeans in spot markets (Table 4) and about 19%  and 36% more corn and soybeans using 
forward contracts (Table 6) than those that had not completed a four-year degree. Education also 
has a significantly positive influence on the proportion of soybeans sold on production contracts 
(Table 7). The results are consistent with prior findings for education’s impact on the proportion 
forward priced using various types of contracts (e.g., Goodwin and Schroeder 1994; Musser, 
Patrick, and Eckman 1996). Shapiro and Brorsen (1988) find that education has a significantly 
negative effect, however, in the specific context of the proportion hedged with futures. 
Intuitively, as risk aversion increases, spot sales of soybeans decrease and forward 
contracting of corn and soybeans increases significantly (Tables 4 and 6). Risk aversion also 
significantly increases the proportion of soybeans sold on production contracts (Table 7). 
Unexpectedly, risk attitude has a statistically insignificant effect on the use of futures and options 
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(Table 5). The result may reflect that motivations for hedging other than risk aversion may exist, 
as identified by Pennings and Leuthold (2000b). Consistent with Shapiro and Brorsen (1988) and 
Musser, Patrick, and Eckman (1996), higher debt-to-asset ratios significantly increase the 
proportional use of futures and options, as relatively more leveraged producers likely use these 
tools to ensure stable cash flows to repay debt. The same logic should apply to forward contract 
use but does not show up statistically. 
Complementarity and substitutability of risk management and marketing tools are 
relatively under-examined aspects of crop marketing. By including alternative contracting 
mechanisms as explanatory variables in regressions, we are able to ascertain such effects. The 
results suggest that producers may substitute forward contracts for futures and options and that 
forward contracts complement production contracts better than futures and options. Specifically, 
forward contracting corn significantly decreases the proportional use of futures and options 
(Table 5), and forward contracting and futures and options use, respectively increase and 
decrease the proportion of soybeans sold on production contracts significantly (Table 7). 
Discussions with surveyed producers provide insight on these results.  Production contracts often 
specify a premium over the cash price for carrying out some special activity (e.g., raising seed or 
non-genetically modified crops or identity preservation), and give the buyer the right to call for 
quantities of grain, often stored on-farm, as needed.  This uncertainty regarding the timing of 
delivery is not conducive to the use of futures and options, and hence, some production contracts 
offer the opportunity to forward price a portion of the secured grain based on current futures 
market prices. 
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Discussion and Conclusions 
Most research on crop marketing and risk management either focus on one aspect of the process 
such as hedging (e.g., Shapiro and Brorsen 1988) or analyze aggregate contracting variables 
(e.g., proportion forward priced) that cannot distinguish differential effects of producer 
characteristics on different contracts or capture potential complementarities among them (e.g., 
Goodwin and Schroeder 1994; Musser, Patrick, and Eckman 1996; Katchova and Miranda 
2004). Pennings, et al. (2008) identify factors influencing the portfolio of marketing and risk 
management tools that producers adopt but do not address how such factors influence the 
proportion in which these tools are used. 
This study investigates the factors influencing Illinois corn and soybean producers’ 
proportional use of futures and options, forward contracts including hedge-to-arrive contracts, 
production contracts, and spot sales without price protection. Like in several earlier studies, these 
producers participate in a university extension farm management program and are representative 
of large commercial producers. Following Katchova and Miranda (2004), we employ Cragg’s 
(1971) hurdle model, which may be more appropriate than commonly used Tobit procedures if 
producers’ marketing practices reflect separate decision processes of adopting a marketing 
method first and choosing the quantity marketed under that method second.  
Interestingly, our results are largely consistent with prior research. Consistent with earlier 
findings for producers’ age (Musser, Patrick, and Eckman 1996) and experience (Shapiro and 
Brorsen1988; Goodwin and Schroeder 1994), older producers are less likely to adopt futures and 
options and sell relatively less using forward and production contracts and more using spot 
markets. Consistent with Goodwin and Schroeder (1994) and Musser, Patrick, and Eckman 
(1996), higher education significantly increases the proportion of the crop forward contracted. 
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Shapiro and Brorsen (1988) and Musser, Patrick, and Eckman (1996) respectively find that the 
proportion of the crop hedged and the proportion forward priced increase with the debt-to-asset 
ratio, which may reflect needs for steady cash flows to repay debt. This variable significantly 
increases the proportion sold using futures and options but not forward contracts in our results. 
Alternatively, the positive relationship may reflect increasing debt to maintain margins in futures 
accounts. Intuitively, increasing risk aversion decreases spot sales and increases the proportion 
sold using forward and production contracts but has no impact on futures and options usage 
which may reflect that motivations for hedging other than risk aversion may exist (Pennings and 
Leuthold 2000b). The results are also consistent with complementarity among forward and 
production contracting and may reflect some degree of substitutability between forward contracts 
and futures and options. 
Using a unique combination of survey and accounting data, this study detects significant 
effects despite a limited sample size. A larger sample size would permit a multinomial Logit 
analysis of producers’ portfolios of marketing and risk management tools, like in Pennings, et al. 
(2008), that would greatly complement the analysis presented here. While the categories of 
marketing methods considered in this study are more disaggregated than in prior research, further 
disaggregation could be informative. The futures and options category could be broken apart into 
separate futures and options categories or into categories for hedging and speculation. The 
forward contracting category could also be split into cash forward sales and hedge-to-arrive 
contract categories. Each of these points appears to be fruitful avenues for future research. 
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1 Subsequently, Katchova and Miranda (2004) performed three hurdle models per commodity to 
explain the proportion contracted, the frequency of contracting, and the contract type (i.e., 
forward or specialty marketing contract), where the models estimated respectively truncated 
tobit, truncated count (i.e., poisson), and binomial logit regressions conditional on a binary 
contract adoption choice (i.e., probit). 
2 The proportion contracted equals the latent variable  for  > 0 and equals 
zero otherwise, where ε  are independently and normally distributed residuals with mean zero 
and variance σ2. 
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Table 1. Selected Results for the Proportion of Crops Sold in Previous Studies. 
 
Shapiro 
and 
Brorsen 
(1988) 
Goodwin 
and 
Schroeder 
(1994) 
Musser, 
Patrick, and 
Eckman 
(1996) 
Sartwelle, O’Brien, Tierney, 
and Eggers (2000) 
Katchova 
and 
Miranda 
(2004) 
Dependent Variable 
Percent 
hedged 
using 
futures  
Percent 
forward 
and 
futures 
Percent 
forward 
priced 
Percent 
cash 
sales 
Percent 
forward 
contracted 
Percent 
futures 
and 
options 
Percent 
sold with 
marketing 
contractsa 
Age – – < 0, C – – – 0 
Experience < 0 0 – 0 0 < 0 – 
Education < 0 > 0, C, S > 0, C – – – 0 
Risk Aversion 0 0 > 0, C, S 0 0 0 – 
Debt/Asset > 0 0 > 0, S – – – 0 
Acres > 0 > 0, C, S – < 0 > 0 0 – 
Gross Income (size) – – < 0, C – – – > 0, C 
Futures Hedging – – > 0, C, S – – – < 0, S 
Forward Contracting 0 – – – – – – 
Crop Insurance 0 0 – < 0 > 0 > 0 0 
R2 0.84 – – 0.17 0.16 0.19 – 
N 41 
171, C, 
238, S 
43 & 53, C 
45& 54, S b 351 351 351 
503, C, 
335, S 
Note: C denotes corn and S denotes soybeans.  > 0 denotes statistically positive effects, < 0 denotes statistically 
negative effects, and 0 denotes effects that are not statistically different from zero. – indicates that the variable was 
not included in the analysis. N denotes sample size. 
a In this study, marketing contracts is an aggregate variable including categories of forward contracts that either set a 
price or tie it to futures markets and other specialty marketing contracts (e.g., seed, non-GM, identity-preserved). 
b Sample sizes correspond to Musser, Patrick, and Eckman’s (1996) analyses of the percentage of expected 
production forward priced by July 15, 1993 and the maximum percentage of expected production forward priced by 
August 1 for corn and soybeans respectively. 
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Table 2. Representativeness of Sample in terms of Size, Returns, and Operator Age. 
    
  
2006 FBFM 
 
Surveyed  
2007 Census  
 
Farms with Pennings et al. (2008) 
Distribution of Farms by Size Producers Harvested Cropland Corn Soybeans     
Over 2,000 acres 8.33% 4.98% 4.50% 2.90% 
1,000 to 1,999 acres 35.42% 5.94% 58.60% 45.10% 
500 to 999 acres 35.42% 9.12% 7.90% 14.40% 
Under 499 acres 20.83% 79.96% 9.80% 14.50% 
     
Mean Statistics  Corn Soybeans     
Size (acres) 1,044 745 731 1,500 to 1,999 range 
Producer Age 55 55 56 40 to 44 range 
Market Value of Products Sold $417,260a $335,767 $322,157 – – 
Crop Returns Per Acreb $488.94 $467.61 $254.84 – – 
Pennings, J.M.E., O. Isengildina-Massa, S.H. Irwin, P. Garcia, and D.L. Good. 2008. “Producers’ Complex Risk  
Management Choices.” Agribusiness: An International Journal 24,(1):31-54. 
2007 Census of Agriculture, available at http://www.agcensus.usda.gov/Publications/2007/Full_Report/usv1.pdf 
a Total crop returns for FBFM producers. 
b http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/CostsAndReturns/testpick.htm   
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Table 3. Representativeness of Sample in terms of Contract Use. 
 Pennings et 
al. (2008)
Goodwin & 
Schroeder (1994) 
Our FBFM    
Sample (2006)   
 Corn  Cropa Corn SoybeansSoybean     
Portion of Producers Adopting      
Futures & Options 41.67% 39.58% Futures: 40.4% 10.73% 5.22% 
Options: 37.0% 9.6% 4.42% 
Forward Contracts 87.50% 83.33%  82.20% 34.46% 30.92% 
Hedge-to-Arrive 33.33% 31.25%  20.60% – – 
Production Contracts 10.42% 25.00%  – – – 
       
Portion of Crop Contracted 
by Contracting Producers 
      
Futures & Options 36.25% 31.68% Futures: – 33.84% 28.65% 
Options: – 29.24% 36.59% 
Forward Contracts 43.11% 39.82%  – 37.18% 33.27% 
Production Contracts 29.00% 34.67%  – – – 
Pennings, J.M.E., O. Isengildina-Massa, S.H. Irwin, P. Garcia, and D.L. Good. 2008. “Producers’ Complex Risk  
Management Choices.” Agribusiness: An International Journal 24,(1):31-54. 
Goodwin, B.K., and T.C. Schroeder. 1994. “Human Capital, Producer Education Programs, and  
the Adoption of Forward-Pricing Methods.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics  
76(November):936-947 
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Table 4.  Marginal Effects for Spot Regressions. 
 Corn Soybeans 
  Hurdle Model  Hurdle Model  
 Tobit 
Binary 
Probit 
Truncated 
OLS Tobit 
Binary 
Probit 
Truncated 
OLS 
AGE 0.0071 -0.0021 0.0108 0.0085* -0.0037 0.0154*** 
 (0.0050) (0.0046) (0.0067) (0.0051) (0.0049) (0.0054) 
EDUCATION -0.1272 -0.0135 -0.1870* -0.1629** -0.0185 -0.2127*** 
 (0.0798) (0.0823) (0.1108) (0.0822) (0.0826) (0.0820) 
ACRES 3.28×10-5 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0000 3.98×10-5 0.0000 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
DEBT/ASSET -0.0036 -0.0036 -0.0013 -0.0042 -0.0053* 0.0025 
 (0.0027) (0.0024) (0.0040) (0.0029) (0.0031) (0.0033) 
RISK ATTITUDE -0.0608 -0.0287 -0.0649 -0.0988*** -0.0341 -0.0768** 
 (0.0371) (0.0352) (0.0512) (0.0384) (0.0361) (0.0393) 
       
  Sigma 0.3796 – 0.2691 0.2572 – 0.2262 
 (0.0663)  (0.0445) (0.0285)  (0.0301) 
Observations 48 48 44 48 48 43 
  Censored 4 at 0% – – 5 at 0% – – 
Log Likelihood -5.9327 -11.2983 7.7303 -8.0250 -10.7690 7.6800 
Asterisk (*), double asterisk (**), and triple asterisk (***) denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.   
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Table 5.  Marginal Effects for Futures and Options Regressions. 
 Corn Soybeans 
  Hurdle Model  Hurdle Model  
 Tobit 
Binary 
Probit 
Truncated 
OLS Tobit 
Binary 
Probit 
Truncated 
OLS 
AGE -0.0189* -0.0188 -0.0110 -0.0183* -0.0216* -0.0071 
 (0.0111) (0.0116) (0.0102) (0.0109) (0.0115) (0.0130) 
EDUCATION 0.1591 0.3014* -0.1551 0.1804 0.2795 0.0196 
 (0.1699) (0.1746) (0.1471) (0.1599) (0.1793) (0.1853) 
ACRES 3.10×10-5 3.05×10-5 -0.0001 -0.0001 2.14×10-5 -0.0002 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) 
DEBT/ASSET 0.0096* 0.0064 0.0104** 0.0110** 0.0041 0.0205*** 
 (0.0053) (0.0055) (0.0045) (0.0048) (0.0051) (0.0058) 
RISK ATTITUDE -0.0316 -0.0287 -0.0149 -0.0212 0.0171 -0.0624 
 (0.0801) (0.0850) (0.0700) (0.0757) (0.0815) (0.0863) 
FORWARDCONRACT -0.4605 -0.2637 -0.6821** -0.3794 -0.3411 -0.3782 
 (0.3453) (0.3578) (0.3470) (0.3073) (0.3361) (0.3614) 
PRODCONTRACT – – – -1.3953 -1.3413 -0.0422 
    (1.1673) (1.0293) (1.7423) 
  Sigma 0.4104 – 0.2115 0.3624 – 0.2141 
 (0.0727)  (0.0472) (0.0648)  (0.0553) 
Observations 48 48 20 48 48 19 
  Censored 28 at 0% – – 29 at 0% – – 
Log Likelihood -25.3969 -27.9637 8.7183 -20.9676 -26.0669 10.4305 
Asterisk (*), double asterisk (**), and triple asterisk (***) denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.   
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Table 6.  Marginal Effects for Forward Contract Regressions. 
 Corn Soybeans 
  Hurdle Model  Hurdle Model  
 Tobit 
Binary 
Probit 
Truncated 
OLS Tobit 
Binary 
Probit 
Truncated 
OLS 
AGE -0.0053 – -0.0071 -0.0100** 3.39×10-5 -0.0205** 
 (0.0041)  (0.0052) (0.0044) (0.0002) (0.0081) 
EDUCATION 0.1731*** – 0.1918** 0.2205*** 0.0002 0.3640*** 
 (0.0662)  (0.0825) (0.0719) (0.0015) (0.1149) 
ACRES 0.0001 – 0.0001* 0.0001* 8.53×10-7 0.0001 
 (0.0001)  (0.0001) (0.0001) (1.00×10-5) (0.0001) 
DEBT/ASSET -0.0010 – -0.0017 0.0011 0.0001 0.0000 
 (0.0023)  (0.0027) (0.0026) (0.0004) (0.0033) 
RISK ATTITUDE 0.0869*** – 0.0906** 0.0840** 0.0003 0.1289** 
 (0.0309)  (0.0397) (0.0344) (0.0021) (0.0523) 
FUTURES&OPTIONS -0.1912 – -0.2752 -0.0789 -0.0017 -0.1225 
 (0.1363)  (0.1758) (0.1586) (0.0102) (0.2147) 
PRODCONTRACT -0.2837 – -0.3838 0.3123** – 0.3733** 
 (0.2931)  (0.3657) (0.1529)  (0.1868) 
  Sigma 0.2053 – 0.227 0.2196 – 0.2413 
 (0.0213)  (0.0296) (0.0237)  (0.0363) 
Observations 48 48 47 48 48 44 
  Censored 1at 0% – – 4 at 0% – – 
Log Likelihood 6.6345 – 11.3290 0.8267 -6.9045 13.5075 
Asterisk (*), double asterisk (**), and triple asterisk (***) denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.   
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Table 7.  Marginal Effects for Production Contract Regressions. 
 Corn Soybeans 
  Hurdle Model  Hurdle Model 
 Tobit 
Binary 
Probit 
Truncated 
OLS Tobit 
Binary 
Probit 
Truncated 
OLS 
AGE -0.0088 – – 0.0037 -0.0017 -0.0178*** 
 (0.0192)   (0.0151) (0.0084) (0.0035) 
EDUCATION -0.1027 – – 0.1276 0.0294 0.4185*** 
 (0.3070)   (0.2722) (0.1498) (0.0561) 
ACRES 0.0003 – – 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001*** 
 (0.0002)   (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0000) 
DEBT/ASSET -0.0021 – – -0.0034 0.0002 -0.0218*** 
 (0.0097)   (0.0086) (0.0046) (0.0025) 
RISK ATTITUDE 0.0877 – – 0.1448 0.0915 0.2009*** 
 (0.1429)   (0.1280) (0.0677) (0.0237) 
FORWARDCONRACT – – – 0.2714 -0.1361 0.7492*** 
    (0.4787) (0.2740) (0.0821) 
FUTURES&OPTIONS – – – -1.2908 -0.7447* -0.5881*** 
    (1.0112) (0.4436) (0.2211) 
       
  Sigma 0.5136 – – 0.5236 – 0.0415 
 (0.2000)   (0.1247)  (0.0087) 
Observations 48 48 5 48 48 12 
  Censored 43 at 0% – – 36 at 0% – – 
Log Likelihood -13.1180 – – -22.5920 -23.0915 22.3076 
Asterisk (*), double asterisk (**), and triple asterisk (***) denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.   
 
 
 
 
